Canada's electoral system at the federal and provincial levels rests on a fundamental assumption: that each geographic area should be represented by a single elected individual. This single-member constituency model has deep roots in British parliamentary tradition, but it faces growing scrutiny. Critics argue it produces distorted results, wastes votes, and poorly reflects diverse communities. Defenders maintain it provides clear local representation and governmental stability. The debate over single-member versus multi-member representation touches fundamental questions about what democracy should achieve and how best to translate citizens' preferences into political power.
How Single-Member Systems Work
First-Past-the-Post
Canada uses first-past-the-post (FPTP) voting in single-member constituencies. The country is divided into ridings, each electing one Member of Parliament. Voters mark one candidate; whoever receives the most votes wins—whether that is a majority or merely the largest minority. The candidate needs only to beat the runner-up by one vote; all other votes for that candidate beyond that margin, and all votes for losing candidates, contribute nothing to the final composition of Parliament.
The Logic of Local Representation
The single-member system is designed around geographic representation. Each MP represents a specific place and its people. Constituents know who their representative is and can hold that individual accountable. The MP serves as a link between community and Parliament, raising local concerns and providing services to constituents. This direct relationship between representative and represented is central to the system's appeal.
Criticisms of Single-Member Representation
Distorted Results
FPTP regularly produces results where parties' seat shares differ dramatically from their vote shares. A party with thirty-five percent of votes nationwide might win a majority of seats, while a party with fifteen percent might win almost none. The same vote share can produce very different seat outcomes depending on how votes are distributed geographically. "Wrong winner" elections—where the party winning the most votes loses the most seats—have occurred in Canada.
These distortions mean that the composition of Parliament does not reflect voters' aggregate preferences. Some parties are systematically over-represented (those with geographically concentrated support), while others are under-represented (those with dispersed support). The translation of votes into seats appears arbitrary to many observers.
Wasted Votes
In single-member systems, only votes for the winning candidate affect the outcome. Votes for losing candidates are "wasted" in the sense that they elect no one. In safe ridings where outcomes are predictable, even votes for the winning candidate above the winning margin are unnecessary. Studies suggest that a majority of votes in Canadian elections elect no one. This reality can contribute to voter apathy—why vote if your vote is unlikely to matter?
Strategic Voting
Single-member FPTP creates pressure for strategic voting. Voters may abandon preferred candidates to vote for less-preferred candidates with better chances of winning, hoping to prevent their least-preferred candidate from winning. This distorts preference expression and makes it difficult to know what voters actually want. Calls to "vote strategically" are perennial in Canadian elections, particularly among those seeking to prevent Conservative majorities.
Two-Party Tendencies
Over time, FPTP tends to reduce viable parties to two major competitors—a pattern known as Duverger's law. Third parties face the "spoiler" problem: their presence may split the vote among similar parties, allowing a candidate opposed by the majority to win. Canada's multiparty system defies this tendency somewhat, but smaller parties struggle to translate votes into seats, and many ridings become two-party contests.
Artificial Majorities
FPTP regularly produces majority governments from minority vote shares—"false majorities" where a party with forty percent or less of votes controls Parliament entirely. These artificial majorities may enable effective governance but raise democratic legitimacy questions. A majority government can govern without any need for cooperation with parties representing the majority of voters.
Alternatives: Multi-Member Representation
Proportional Representation
Proportional representation (PR) systems aim to align seat shares with vote shares. Various PR methods exist: party-list systems where votes for parties determine seat allocation, single transferable vote (STV) where voters rank candidates in multi-member districts, and mixed systems combining single-member constituencies with proportional top-ups. What unites PR systems is the use of multi-member districts that allow voters with diverse preferences to elect representatives.
Mixed-Member Proportional
Mixed-member proportional (MMP) systems—used in Germany, New Zealand, and proposed in various Canadian reform efforts—combine single-member ridings with regional proportional seats. Voters cast two ballots: one for a local representative, one for a party. The proportional seats compensate for distortions in the local results, producing overall seat shares that approximate vote shares while maintaining local representation.
Single Transferable Vote
STV uses multi-member districts where voters rank candidates. Through a counting process that transfers surplus votes and eliminates trailing candidates, multiple representatives are elected from each district proportionally. STV maintains some geographic representation while allowing voters to choose among individual candidates rather than party lists.
Arguments for Single-Member Constituencies
Clear Accountability
Single-member systems provide unambiguous accountability. Voters know exactly who their representative is. That representative cannot hide behind collective responsibility or party lists. If constituents are dissatisfied, they can vote the incumbent out. This direct accountability relationship is valued by many voters and MPs alike.
Stable Government
FPTP's tendency to produce majority governments is sometimes defended as promoting stability and decisive governance. Proportional systems often produce coalition governments, which may be less stable and require ongoing negotiation. Those who value strong, coherent government may prefer the single-member system's tendency to manufacture majorities.
Local Representation
Single-member constituencies ensure every geographic area has a dedicated representative. In multi-member systems, some areas might elect representatives of only one party, leaving voters who supported other parties without someone who shares their views. The geographic link between representative and place may be more diffuse under multi-member systems.
Simplicity
FPTP is straightforward—mark one name, count the votes, most wins. Proportional systems involve more complex ballots, counting procedures, and explanations of how seats are allocated. Whether simplicity is a decisive virtue is debatable, but it is a real feature of single-member plurality voting.
Canadian Reform Efforts
Provincial Referenda
Several Canadian provinces have held referenda on electoral reform. British Columbia voted on STV in 2005 (receiving 57% support, below the 60% threshold required) and 2009 (receiving 39%). Ontario voted on MMP in 2007 (receiving 37%). Prince Edward Island voted on MMP in 2016 (receiving majority support with low turnout) and 2019 (receiving 48%). None resulted in system change.
Federal Promises
The Liberal Party under Justin Trudeau campaigned in 2015 on a promise that it would be the last federal election under FPTP. After forming government, an all-party committee studied reform options but members disagreed on the path forward. The government abandoned the commitment in 2017, citing lack of consensus. The episode illustrated both public interest in reform and the difficulty of achieving it.
Barriers to Change
Electoral reform faces significant barriers. Parties that benefit from current distortions have little incentive to change. Referenda on complex voting systems often fail. The public may be skeptical of change proposed by incumbent governments. There is no consensus among reformers about which alternative is best. Substantial change would require constitutional amendment for Senate elections and provincial consent for federal elections.
Questions for Further Discussion
- Should electoral systems prioritize local representation or proportionality between votes and seats?
- Is governmental stability a sufficient justification for systems that distort voter preferences?
- Why have Canadian referenda on electoral reform consistently failed, and what does this suggest about prospects for change?
- Would proportional representation improve or damage the quality of Canadian democracy?
- How should decisions about electoral systems be made—by referendum, parliamentary action, or some other process?