If They Can Map Our Movements, We Should Be Able to Map the Cameras
Public licence-plate readers may serve legitimate safety purposes. That does not remove the public’s right to know where surveillance operates, who controls the data, and whether the system is working as promised.
Canada maps its roads, hydrants, polling places and public buildings. Now a consumer navigation app is mapping something public authorities have often left much harder to see: the cameras recording vehicles as they pass.
MapQuest has introduced a “surveillance” layer that marks some automated licence-plate readers, or ALPRs, in Canada and the United States with animated eyes. The company says it added the feature after users asked to see camera locations. The locations come from open, crowd-sourced OpenStreetMap data rather than a complete government inventory.[1]
That makes the map an imperfect but revealing civic artifact. It does not show everything. It may contain errors. Yet its very existence raises a basic question:
When a public authority creates a system capable of mapping people’s movements, should the public receive a map of the system?
The answer should be yes—not because every technical detail must be exposed, and not because all surveillance is illegitimate, but because democratic oversight becomes difficult when the physical and institutional shape of surveillance is invisible.
A licence plate is not just a licence plate
An ALPR observation can connect a vehicle identifier with a place and a time. A single observation may be mundane. A searchable collection of observations can become a record of movement: which roads a vehicle used, which communities it entered, and when it appeared at a particular location.[1][2]
Police services point to legitimate operational uses. CBC reports that police describe ALPRs as tools for identifying stolen vehicles, locating missing people and detecting vehicles associated with criminal investigations. Police also say that most data is deleted quickly and that access is limited to authorized law-enforcement purposes.[1]
Those benefits deserve to be considered on their merits. So do the risks.
The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada has warned that generalized public surveillance subjects many law-abiding people to observation without individualized suspicion. Its archived guidance for police video surveillance says that public authorities should demonstrate a pressing and substantial problem, consider less privacy-invasive alternatives, conduct a privacy impact assessment, consult affected communities and limit collection, access, disclosure and retention.[2]
The guidance predates today’s generation of networked ALPR systems and is explicitly archived.[2] That makes it insufficient as a current technical rulebook, but its central questions remain highly relevant: Is the surveillance necessary? Is it proportionate? Is it effective? Who is accountable? What happens to information about people who were never suspected of wrongdoing?
The public should not have to reconstruct the system from lamp posts
OpenStreetMap has an approved man_made=surveillance tag for mapping cameras and other surveillance equipment. Its documentation allows contributors to add information such as an operator.[3] MapQuest is turning some of that volunteer-created information into a layer ordinary drivers can understand.[1]
That is a useful exercise in civic transparency, but crowd-sourcing cannot substitute for public disclosure by the organizations operating the systems.[1][2][3]
A resident should not have to notice a device, photograph it, identify its manufacturer, add it to a volunteer map and search municipal records before learning who is collecting information on a public road.[1][3] Nor should the public be left to guess whether two nearby cameras are isolated devices or part of a searchable regional, national or cross-border network.
A public surveillance registry should disclose, at minimum:
- the responsible public body or private operator;
- the general location and type of device;
- the stated purpose and legal authority for collection;
- what information is captured;
- whether non-matching observations are retained and for how long;
- which organizations can search or receive the information;
- whether storage or processing occurs outside Canada;
- the privacy impact assessment and governing policy;
- aggregate search, match, error and misuse statistics;
- the date and result of the latest independent audit; and
- a contact and complaint process.
This would not be a radical departure from established Canadian privacy principles. The federal commissioner’s police-surveillance guidance says people may reasonably want to know who authorized recording, why information was collected, what it is used for, who has access and how long it is retained. It also recommends clear public notice, documented disclosures, limited access, independent audits and public availability of audit and evaluation results.[2]
Private operation does not erase these concerns. Federal private-sector guidance says organizations using overt video surveillance should inform the public, secure recorded images, restrict access, destroy information when it is no longer required, document external disclosures and be prepared to explain who is watching and why.[4]
Transparency must include procurement and jurisdiction
Camera locations are only the visible edge of the system. The more important map may be institutional rather than geographic.
Who bought the equipment? Who hosts the database? Does the municipality own the information, or merely receive access to a vendor’s platform? Can another police service search it? Can a contractor use observations to improve another product? What contractual obligations apply after an agreement expires? Where are backups stored? Which country’s laws govern the service provider and its infrastructure?
These questions belong in public procurement records before deployment, not only in access-to-information requests after controversy develops.
Follow-the-money reporting also matters. Residents should be able to compare the promised public benefit with the complete cost of the program: hardware, connectivity, subscriptions, maintenance, data storage, integration, staff time, audits and eventual decommissioning. A system should not be declared successful merely because it generated many alerts. Its evaluation should ask whether it addressed the original public-safety problem, how many alerts were accurate, what harms or inequities appeared, and whether a less intrusive approach could have produced comparable results.
The Privacy Commissioner’s police guidance recommends regular independent evaluation, including whether the original problem remains significant and whether surveillance has actually addressed it. It also contemplates ending a system that is no longer justified or has proven ineffective.[2]
The strongest case against publishing locations
There is a serious opposing argument: an exact public map could help people evade detection, identify investigative patterns, damage equipment or interfere with legitimate police work. CBC notes that ALPR cameras have already become targets of controversy and vandalism in the United States.[1]
Transparency therefore requires design, not absolutism.
A public registry need not expose live feeds, network addresses, blind spots, maintenance schedules or active investigative configurations. In sensitive circumstances, it could show a general area rather than precise coordinates. Information could be delayed where an immediate disclosure would create a demonstrable operational risk. Independent oversight bodies could inspect details that cannot responsibly be published.
But “operational sensitivity” should not become a blanket explanation for institutional invisibility. The burden should remain on the authority to justify a specific withholding, while the default record still explains the system’s existence, purpose, operator, data practices, cost and oversight.
From a map of cameras to a map of accountability
MapQuest’s moving eyes are visually memorable, but the real civic opportunity is larger.[1] Public maps could become an accountability layer connecting physical devices to policies, contracts, privacy assessments, retention schedules, audit results and complaint mechanisms.[2]
That would allow residents to ask better questions without pretending that every camera is abusive or every objection is anti-police. It would also help responsible police services demonstrate that their systems are limited, effective and governed as promised.
The goal is not to make legitimate public-safety work impossible. It is to prevent a quiet shift from targeted investigation to routine, networked collection without a corresponding increase in public visibility and democratic control.[2]
If an institution can search where vehicles have been, the public should be able to search what institution is watching, under what authority, for how long and with whose money.
That is not a demand for darkness. It is a demand that the watchers operate in the light.
This is a civic analysis that reaches a conclusion and invites challenge, particularly on how a public registry should balance meaningful transparency with legitimate operational security.
Sources
[1] https://www.cbc.ca/news/mapquest-surveillance-camera-canada-flock-9.7393090 — MapQuest now showing surveillance camera locations across Canada, U.S. | CBC News [2] https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/privacy-topics/surveillance/police-and-public-safety/vs_060301 — Archived: Guidelines for the Use of Video Surveillance of Public Places by Police and Law Enforcement Authorities | OPC [3] https://wiki.openstreetmap.org/wiki/Tag:man_made%3Dsurveillance — Tag: man_made=surveillance | OpenStreetMap Wiki [4] https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/privacy-topics/surveillance/video-surveillance-by-businesses/gl_vs_080306 — Guidelines for Overt Video Surveillance in the Private Sector | OPC
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